




THE APPLICABILITY OF STATE APPEAL BOND CAPS IN SUITS 
BROUGHT IN FEDERAL COURTS PURSUANT  
TO DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 
JESSE WENGER† 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 980 
I. OVERVIEW OF SUPERSEDEAS BONDS IN FEDERAL AND 
 STATE COURTS ........................................................................ 981 
A. Staying a Judgment on Appeal in Federal Court .............................. 982 
1. Brief History of Supersedeas Practice in the  
Federal Courts ................................................................... 983 
2. Current Approach to Supersedeas Practice in the  
Federal Courts ................................................................... 984 
B. Staying Judgments on Appeal in the State Courts and the  
Push for Appeal Bond Reform ....................................................... 986 
1. Motivation for Appeal Bond Reform .................................. 987 
2. Varieties of Appeal Bond Reform Statutes and  
Their Underlying Rationales .............................................. 989 
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE COURT’S ERIE DOCTRINE  
EVOLUTION ............................................................................. 990 
A. The Evolution of the Court’s Hanna-Prong Analysis ....................... 992 
B. The Evolution of the Court’s RDA-Prong Analysis .......................... 994 
1. Outcome-Determinative Approach ..................................... 994 
 
† Senior Editor, Volume 162, University of Pennsylvania Law Review. J.D. Candidate, 2014, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2011, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to 
thank Professor Catherine Struve for her help in selecting a topic and for her insight and guidance 
throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank the editors and associate editors of the 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review for their incredible contributions to this Comment. Last, I 
would like to thank my family and future wife, Becca. Without their love and support I would not 
be the person I am today. 
  
980 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 979 
 
2. Federal–State Interest-Balancing Approach ........................ 995 
3. Modified Outcome-Determinative Approach ...................... 996 
4. A Rebirth of Byrd? ............................................................. 996 
III. APPLYING THE ERIE DOCTRINE TO STATE APPEAL BOND  
REFORM STATUTES AND FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL  
PROCEDURE 62(d) ................................................................... 998 
A. Hanna-Prong Analysis of Rule 62(d) and State Appeal Bond  
Reform Provisions ....................................................................... 998 
1. State Appeal Bond Reform Statutes Do Not Affect  
Rule 62(d)’s Process Requirements ..................................... 999 
2. Appeal Bond Caps and Judicial Discretion ......................... 1000 
3. The Case for Accommodation ........................................... 1002 
B. RDA-Prong Analysis of Rule 62(d) and State Appeal Bond  
Reform Provisions ...................................................................... 1005 
1. Outcome-Determinative Test ............................................ 1005 
2. Byrd Balancing of State and Federal Interests ..................... 1007 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 1008 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 2000, forty-one states have passed appeal bond reform statutes, a 
tort reform measure that, in some shape or form, caps the amount of a 
supersedeas bond a defendant must secure in order to stay the execution of 
a judgment while pursuing an appeal.1 The state statutes vary widely in 
their operation, but their underlying goal is to protect a defendant’s right to 
appeal massive damages awards without putting himself in dire financial 
straits just to secure a sufficient supersedeas bond.2 Prior to the wave of 
reform beginning in 2000, state courts often required a bond in the amount 
of the full judgment plus costs and interest, which could be prohibitively 
 
1 The terms “supersedeas bond” and “appeal bond” are often confused. A supersedeas bond is 
what a defendant must obtain to secure the judgment and prevent the plaintiff from collecting the 
judgment while the case is on appeal. See FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d). In contrast, an appeal bond 
secures the appellant’s costs on appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 7; see also Doug Rendleman, A Cap on 
the Defendant’s Appeal Bond?: Punitive Damages Tort Reform, 39 AKRON L. REV. 1089, 1096 n.25 
(2006) (noting that, although professional usage during the tort reform debates has combined the 
terms “supersedeas bond” and “appeal bond,” the two have different technical meanings). Because 
the movement to reform state supersedeas bond statutes has largely used the term “appeal bond” 
instead of “supersedeas bond,” scholars use the terms interchangeably, as does this Comment. See id. 
2 Cf. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-12-103 (2013) (instituting an appeal bond cap “in order to 
ensure that financial considerations do not adversely impact the right of appeal”). But see 
Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1143-49 (arguing that appeal bond caps support a defendant’s right to 
appeal, but noting that this argument was not thoroughly discussed in many state legislatures 
passing the early appeal bond reform statutes).  
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expensive if the verdict was for hundreds of millions—or billions—of 
dollars.3 This Comment addresses whether state statutes capping super-
sedeas bond amounts are applicable in federal courts exercising diversity 
jurisdiction, or whether such statutes conflict with Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP) 62(d)—the rule governing postjudgment stays pursuant 
to supersedeas bonds.  
Section I.A begins with a discussion of the origins and evolution of su-
persedeas practice in the federal courts. Section I.B continues with an 
explanation of why tort reformers pushed for appeal bond reform and 
describes the approaches that various states currently take toward super-
sedeas practice. Part II provides a brief summary of the evolution of the 
Erie4 doctrine. Finally, Part III evaluates the applicability of state appeal 
bond reform statutes in federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction, in 
light of the Court’s Erie jurisprudence. This Comment concludes that 
federal courts should interpret Rule 62(d) as not entirely covering the issue 
of how much a defendant must secure by supersedeas bond in order to stay 
execution of a judgment during appeal. Rather, federal courts should go on 
to apply Erie and its progeny in deciding this issue. Under a traditional Erie 
analysis, however, the applicability of appeal bond reform statutes is not 
likely to be deemed outcome-determinative. Yet, if a court were to accept 
the argument that the applicability of appeal bond caps is an outcome-
determinative decision because such caps sufficiently alter the settlement 
landscape, then balancing the state’s interest in capping appeal bonds with 
the federal interest in applying Rule 62(d) leads to the conclusion that 
federal courts sitting in diversity should apply the state statutes capping 
appeal bonds. 
  
I. OVERVIEW OF SUPERSEDEAS BONDS IN  
FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 
When a defendant in a civil suit is held liable for monetary damages 
following an adverse judgment, he has several options for obtaining review 
of the verdict. A defendant may, for example, seek a new trial or review of the 
judgment in the trial court,5 or he may seek appellate review if his postverdict 
motions prove unsuccessful.6 This Comment focuses on the circumstances 
 
3 See infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text. 
4 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
5 FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a), (e). 
6 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (granting the United States Courts of Appeal jurisdiction to 
hear appeals from final decisions of the United States District Courts). 
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surrounding an appeal of an adverse judgment. When a defendant seeks to 
avail himself of the appellate process to review the verdict and damages 
award, the parties are confronted with a problem: the judgment debtor (the 
losing defendant) does not want to pay the award before the appellate 
review process is complete, while the judgment creditor (the winning 
plaintiff ) wants to collect the judgment without delay. The procedural 
solution to this conflict of interest has been to stay execution of the judg-
ment, usually conditioned on the judgment debtor posting a supersedeas 
bond or otherwise securing the judgment until the final disposition of the 
defendant’s appeal.7 The supersedeas bond serves to “preserve the status 
quo while protecting the non-appealing party’s rights pending appeal.”8 The 
supersedeas bond maintains the status quo by allowing the defendant to stay 
enforcement of the judgment, thereby allowing the defendant to avoid the 
risk of having to pursue the plaintiff and seek restitution if the appeal is 
successful, while simultaneously securing the monetary award for the 
plaintiff in the event the appeal is unsuccessful.9  
A. Staying a Judgment on Appeal in Federal Court 
In the federal courts, FRCP 62 governs the stay of proceedings to en-
force a judgment. While Rule 62(a) generally affords judgment debtors an 
automatic fourteen-day stay after entry of an adverse judgment and Rule 
62(b) gives the trial judge the discretion to stay any enforcement proceeding 
pending the disposition of certain postverdict motions, it is Rules 62(d) and 
Rule 62(f) that govern stays during the pendency of an appeal. Rules 62(d) 
and 62(f) are the two primary alternatives the Federal Rules provide for the 
 
7 See Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1094, 1097 (discussing the competing goals that appeal 
bonds serve—they help preserve the defendant’s right to appeal while assuring the plaintiff that 
payment is available and that the appeal was not entirely frivolous, since the defendant must pay a 
bond premium); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d), (f ) (providing that an appellant can obtain a stay 
either by posting a supersedeas bond or without posting a bond whenever a stay would be available 
according to state law and provided that Rule 62(f )’s other requirements are met); Acevedo-García 
v. Vera-Monroig, 296 F.3d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 2002) (describing the two ways in which stays are 
ordinarily sought—that is, under Rule 62(d) or 62(f )); Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm. 
Ass’n, 636 F.2d 755, 757-58 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding that a district court may, in its sound 
discretion, authorize unsecured or undersecured stays in appropriate cases, such as where an 
appellant provides assurances or other adequate security). 
8 Poplar Grove Planting & Ref. Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d 1189, 1190-91 (5th 
Cir. 1979). 
9 See Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1098-99 (explaining that appeal bonds are attractive because 
a plaintiff can collect directly from the appeal bond should the judgment be affirmed while a 
defendant would not have to give up valuable assets and subsequently sue for restitution should 
the appellate court reverse); Poplar Grove, 600 F.2d at 1191 (same). 
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stay of monetary judgments pending appeal.10 Rule 62(f) provides that “[i]f 
a judgment is a lien on the judgment debtor’s property under the law of the 
state where the court is located, the judgment debtor is entitled to the same 
stay of execution the state court would give.”11 If a judgment debtor is able 
to meet the requirements of 62(f), including the conditions required by 
state law for a stay of execution, the district court must grant the stay.12 
Alternatively, Rule 62(d), the primary focus of this Comment, automatically 
stays a monetary judgment once the judgment debtor posts an appropriate 
supersedeas bond.13 However, it is important to note that a defendant’s 
appeal is not dependent upon obtaining a supersedeas bond. A defendant 
can always appeal a verdict from the district court without meeting any of 
Rule 62’s requirements. In that scenario, the judgment creditor can move to 
collect the judgment as soon as the fourteen-day automatic stay has 
elapsed.14  
1. Brief History of Supersedeas Practice in the Federal Courts 
The federal court system has incorporated supersedeas practice since 
the Judiciary Act of 1789.15 Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in 1938, the rules and procedures for obtaining a stay upon 
appeal were codified by statute.16 Present-day Rules 62(d) and 62(f) are 
substantively the same as the versions contained in the original 1938 
edition of the Rules. Rule 62, however, does not “precisely define the 
amount and conditions of a supersedeas bond.”17 The original version of the 
 
10 E.g., Acevedo-García, 296 F.3d at 17. 
11 FED. R. CIV. P. 62(f ). 
12 Acevedo-García, 296 F.3d at 17. 
13 Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d) (“If an appeal is taken, the appellant may obtain a stay 
by supersedeas bond . . . .”). 
14 See Acevedo-García, 296 F.3d at 17 (pointing out that plaintiffs are free to seek execution of 
their judgments if a stay has not been granted on any ground). 
15 See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 23, 1 Stat. 73, 85; see also Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U.S. 150, 159 
(1883) (“To remedy the inconveniences that arose from an immediate issue of execution before the 
appellate proceedings could be perfected, the original judiciary act of 1789 provided . . . that no 
execution shall issue upon judgments in the courts of the United States, where a writ of error may 
be a supersedeas, until the expiration of ten days after the judgment.”); In re Fed. Facilities Realty 
Trust, 227 F.2d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 1955) (explaining that supersedeas practice “is a creature of 
statutory origin,” which existed “[f]rom the inception of the federal judiciary”). 
16 See 28 U.S.C. § 841 (1934) (repealed 1948) (providing a stay of execution where judgments 
are liens on the property of a defendant, which was later adopted by Rule 62(f )); 28 U.S.C. § 874 
(1934) (repealed 1948) (allowing the defendant to obtain a supersedeas bond to stay enforcement 
of a judgment pending appeal, which was later adopted by Rule 62(d)). 
17 Poplar Grove Planting & Ref. Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d 1189, 1191 (5th 
Cir. 1979). 
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Rules filled this gap with Rule 73(d), which, in relevant part, directed that 
when a defendant obtained a supersedeas bond to stay the enforcement of a 
monetary judgment  
the amount of the bond shall be fixed at such sum as will cover the whole 
amount of the judgment . . . , costs on the appeal, interest, and damages 
for delay, unless the court after notice and hearing and for good cause 
shown fixes a different amount or orders security other than the bond.18  
When the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) became effec-
tive in 1968, FRAP 8 abrogated and supplanted FRCP 73.19 However, the 
rulemakers neither amended FRCP 62 to include the substance of former 
FRCP 73(d) nor wrote FRAP 8 to contain the detail of the rule it supplant-
ed.20 Without FRCP 73(d) directing courts regarding the sufficiency of a 
supersedeas bond, the federal courts were left to decide the amount a 
defendant had to secure via supersedeas bond in order to receive a stay 
under FRCP 62(d). 
2. Current Approach to Supersedeas Practice in the Federal Courts 
After the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure supplanted former 
FRCP 73, the federal courts first had to decide whether posting a super-
sedeas bond would be a procedural requirement for obtaining a stay pursu-
ant to FRCP 62(d). Former Rule 73(d) had explicitly provided for a stay by 
“security other than the bond” if a defendant could show good cause,21 but 
Rule 62(d) simply states that the “appellant may obtain a stay by super-
sedeas bond.”22  While some courts viewed the supersedeas bond as a 
necessary condition for obtaining a stay under Rule 62(d),23 most courts 
took the position that Rule 62(d) provided a stay as a matter of right if a 
defendant posted a supersedeas bond but retained the discretion to allow for 
unsecured stays or stays secured by alternative means.24  
 
18 FED. R. CIV. P. 73(d), 383 U.S. 1061-62 (1966) (abrogated and supplanted 1968). 
19 Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm. Ass’n, 636 F.2d 755, 758-59 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
20 Id. 
21 FED. R. CIV. P. 73(d), 383 U.S. 1062 (1966) (abrogated and supplanted 1968). 
22 FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d). 
23 See Fed. Prescription Serv., 636 F.2d at 757 n.3 (citing cases holding that a supersedeas bond 
is required to grant a stay under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
24 See id. at 757-58 (rejecting the view that a supersedeas bond is required to stay collection of 
a judgment on appeal and holding that the district court has discretion to accept less secure 
means); see also Hurley v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 944 F. Supp. 371, 374 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing 
numerous circuit court decisions holding that district courts have the discretion to allow unsecured 
stays). 
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Next, the federal courts needed to determine the amount of the judg-
ment a defendant would have to secure by supersedeas bond when pursuing 
a stay as a matter of right under Rule 62(d). Again, the prevailing view in 
the federal courts has been to follow the directive contained in former Rule 
73(d) and to require a supersedeas bond in the amount of the full judgment 
plus costs and interest while giving the district courts discretion to set the 
bond at a lower amount if an appellant shows good cause.25 Many jurisdic-
tions across the nation have explicitly provided for this method of calculat-
ing the amount of a supersedeas bond in their local court rules.26  
Judges have considered various factors when faced with a judgment 
debtor’s motion to either forego the supersedeas bond requirement in its 
entirety, reduce the amount required for the supersedeas bond, or allow an 
alternative form of security to obtain a stay. These factors include the 
following: (1) the defendant’s financial position and a bond’s threat to the 
defendant’s solvency; (2) the confidence the district court has in the defend-
ant’s ability to pay the judgment; (3) the extent to which posting the bond 
would be impracticable or impossible; (4) the harm to the defendant if a 
stay were not granted; (5) the availability of alternative security arrange-
ments that could protect the appellee; (6) the anticipated length of the 
appeal process; (7) the ability of the defendant to remain solvent throughout 
the appeal; and (8) the merits of the defendant’s appeal.27 Nevertheless, 
some federal courts have refused to depart from their standard requirement 
of demanding a supersedeas bond in the amount of the entire judgment, 
even in the face of a defendant’s insolvency.28 These courts have generally 
 
25 See Strong v. Laubach, 443 F.3d 1297, 1299 (10th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that district 
courts have the discretion to set the amount of the supersedeas bond lower than the full amount of 
the judgment); Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1154-55 (2d Cir. 1986) (looking to 
“equitable principles” to determine the adequate security needed to grant a stay, which may be less 
than the amount of the full judgment “when the creditor’s interest . . . would not be unduly 
endangered”), rev’d on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1 (1987); Fed. Prescription Serv., 636 F.2d at 758 
(citing authorities holding that courts can take into account financial hardship and alternative 
assurances of payment when setting the required supersedeas bond amount); Poplar Grove 
Planting & Ref. Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d 1189, 1191 (5th Cir. 1979) (allowing the 
district court to require less than a full security supersedeas bond if the judgment debtor can 
demonstrate reasons for doing so). 
26 See, e.g., S.D. FLA. R. 62.1(a) (requiring the full amount of the judgment plus ten per-
cent); E.D. LA. R. 62.2 ( judgment plus twenty percent); D. MASS. R. 62.2 ( judgment plus ten 
percent); N.D. TEX. R. 62.1 ( judgment plus twenty percent). 
27 2 Joseph M. McLaughlin, McLaughlin on Class Actions: Law and Practice § 7:19 (10th ed. 
2013); see also Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1100 (providing a list of “good cause” factors that might 
move a federal judge “to dispense with an appeal bond or to set a lower bond”). 
28 See, e.g., Hurley, 944 F. Supp. at 377-78 (declining to waive or modify the bond require-
ment solely on the basis of a judgment debtor’s “prospective inability to pay”); Endress + Hauser, 
Inc. v. Hawk Measurement Sys. Pty. Ltd., 932 F. Supp. 1147, 1148-49, 1150-52 (S.D. Ind. 1996) 
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found that the potentially insolvent judgment debtor failed to carry his 
burden of proving “good cause,” as required by former Rule 73(d), for lifting 
the requirement of a full supersedeas bond. 
B. Staying Judgments on Appeal in the State Courts and the  
Push for Appeal Bond Reform 
The state court systems also have procedures that allow judgment debt-
ors to stay execution of a judgment during the pendency of an appeal, 
provided the judgment debtor secures the damages award, usually by 
supersedeas bond. Prior to 2000, state supersedeas bond provisions fell into 
three broad categories: (1) provisions granting judges the discretion to set 
the bond at an amount they deemed appropriate (or to provide for alterna-
tive security arrangements), similar to the federal system described above; 
(2) provisions mandating the supersedeas bond to cover the amount of the 
full judgment (or the full judgment plus costs and interest);29 and (3) 
provisions allowing an automatic stay upon appeal without requiring any 
supersedeas bond at all.30 However, in response to several massive jury 
verdicts arising from the tobacco litigation, the tort reform movement led a 
concerted effort to reform state appeal bond statutes. 31  Several other 
enormous jury verdicts outside the tobacco arena, including Texaco Inc. v. 
Pennzoil Co.,32 O’Keefe v. Loewen Group, Inc.,33 and the judgment resulting 
 
(refusing to grant a judgment debtor a stay, despite the threat of insolvency, because the debtor 
could not demonstrate a likelihood of success on appeal and did not present an alternate plan to 
provide adequate security in lieu of a supersedeas bond); United States v. Kurtz, 528 F. Supp. 1113, 
1115 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (indicating that an unsupported allegation of financial inability to post a bond 
would not suffice in convincing the court to waive the bond requirement). 
29 See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 364(b) (repealed 1986) (“When the judgment awards recovery of 
a sum of money, the amount of the bond or deposit shall be at least the amount of the judgment, 
interest, and costs.”).  
30 See, e.g., ME. R. CIV. P. 62(e) (“[T]he taking of an appeal from a judgment shall operate 
as a stay of execution upon the judgment during the pendency of the appeal, and no supersedeas 
bond or other security shall be required as a condition of such stay.”). 
31 See Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1108 (“A $164 billion appeal bond in a smokers’ class ac-
tion . . . ushered in the first wave of appeal-bond cap legislation.”); see also Appeal Bond Reform, 
AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, http://www.atra.org/issues/appeal-bond-reform (last visited Feb. 21, 
2014) [hereinafter ATRA] (listing appeal bond reform as one of the tort reform issues on which 
the American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) focuses and stating ATRA’s support for “appeal 
bond reform legislation that limits the size of an appeal bond when a company is not liquidating 
its assets or attempting to flee from justice”). 
32 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d, 481 U.S. 1 (1987). This case involved a tortious interfer-
ence with contract claim that arose out of a failed corporate takeover attempt and resulted in an 
$11.12 billion award. Id. at 1137. 
33 No. 91-67-423 (Miss. Cir. Ct. 1995), collaterally reviewed by Loewen Group, Inc. v. United 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award ( June 26, 2003), 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003); see also 
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from the Exxon Valdez oil spill,34 provided additional motivation for tort 
reformers to push for appeal bond reform.35  
1. Motivation for Appeal Bond Reform 
One of the problems flowing from massive damages awards was the cost 
to obtain a supersedeas bond, which could be prohibitively expensive, even 
for large multinational corporations.36 A corporate defendant attempting to 
stay execution of a hypothetical jury verdict of $500 million in a state 
requiring a supersedeas bond in the amount of 125% of the judgment would 
have to put up $625 million to secure the bond, plus an additional 1% to 3% 
premium to the surety company.37 A defendant’s failure to post a bond in 
such a case would allow the plaintiff to collect on the judgment, possibly 
forcing the defendant into dire financial straits or bankruptcy, even if the 
defendant has a valid basis for appeal. However, the alternative is just as 
bleak—the cost of posting the supersedeas bond can throw the corporate 
defendant into bankruptcy, with severe consequences for the business, its 
employees, and its other creditors.38 The Second Circuit faced these issues 
in Texaco when Texaco argued that Texas’s mandatory supersedeas bond 
statute—which would have required a bond of more than $12 billion to stay 
execution of the $11.12 billion judgment—violated its constitutional due 
process rights.39 The Second Circuit agreed, holding that it would be 
impossible for Texaco to post a $12 billion bond, despite having a net worth 
of $23 billion: obtaining a bond of such magnitude would push the company 
into liquidation or bankruptcy.40 The court went on to explain that the 
 
Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1128 (explaining how the Canadian defendant Raymond Loewen, 
unable to pay for an appeal bond of 125% of the $500 million verdict, thought “that the bond 
requirement foreclosed his right to appeal” and decided to settle for $129 million). 
34 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 481 (2008) (noting that the original jury 
verdict against Exxon totaled $5 billion, and was subsequently reduced to $2.5 billion by the court 
of appeals). 
35 See Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1089-90 (summarizing “lawsuits with blockbuster damages,” 
including Texaco, O’Keefe, and the Exxon Valdez suit). 
36 See id. at 1102-03; see also ATRA, supra note 31 (noting that appealing a billion-dollar ver-
dict “can force an individual, a company, or an industry into bankruptcy”). 
37 See, e.g., Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1102 & n.54, 1128; Jonathan Harr, The Burial, NEW 
YORKER, Nov. 1, 1999, at 70, 93. 
38 See Mark A. Behrens & Andrew W. Crouse, The Evolving Civil Justice Reform Movement: 
Procedural Reforms Have Gained Steam, but Critics Still Focus on Arguments of the Past, 31 U. DAYTON 
L. REV. 173, 183 (2006) (naming workers and shareholders as victims of bond-induced bankruptcy); 
Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1129-30 (noting that bankruptcy harms not only the judgment debtor, 
but also its creditors, suppliers, employees, shareholders, and the state’s business climate).  
39 Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1136-39 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d, 481 U.S. 1 (1987). 
40 Id. at 1138, 1152. 
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mandatory bond requirement lacked “any rational basis, since it would destroy 
Texaco and render its right to appeal in Texas an exercise in futility.”41 
Looking instead to the discretionary approach of the federal courts in 
setting supersedeas bond amounts, the court allowed Texaco to post a bond 
in an amount substantially less than the $12 billion demanded by the Texas 
state courts.42 
To alleviate the injustice of imposing severe obstacles to a defendant’s 
ability to appeal, tort reformers began a movement to sway state legislatures 
to cap the amount a defendant must pay to secure a supersedeas bond.43 
However, the political will to adopt appeal bond reform measures did not 
materialize in state legislatures until 2000, when massive jury verdicts 
against tobacco companies threatened the payment streams that states were 
receiving under the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA).44 As a conse-
quence, the first wave of appeal bond reform legislation largely focused on 
limiting the amount a signatory to the MSA (i.e., the tobacco companies 
facing multibillion dollar verdicts and their successors and affiliates) could 
be forced to pay to secure a supersedeas bond.45 Since 2000, however, appeal 
bond reform has swept the nation, with many states passing statutes that 
apply to any defendant in a civil case, not just signatories to the MSA. 
Currently, forty-one states cap appeal bonds, either legislatively or by court 
rule.46 Five additional states automatically suspend execution of a judgment 
when a case is on appeal without requiring the defendant to post a super-
sedeas bond.47 Four states have not capped appeal bonds in any manner.48  
 
41 Id. at 1145. 
42 Id. at 1154-57. 
43 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
44 Behrens & Crouse, supra note 38, at 183; Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1108, 1112; see also N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 52:4D-13(a)(3) (West 2009) (“If a tobacco company faced with a large judgment 
could not afford to post a bond under State law it might be forced to declare bankruptcy, and this 
could interrupt the flow of payments to the State under the [MSA].”). 
45 See Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1108-16. For an example of this type of appeal bond reform 
statute, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 104558(a) (West 2005), which imposes an appeal 
bond cap of $150 million for MSA signatories and their affiliates and successors. 
46 See ATRA, supra note 31 (listing forty states that have passed appeal bond reform legisla-
tion and providing a brief description of the cap each state has instituted). In addition to the forty 
states listed on the ATRA website, Illinois has also passed a cap on appeal bonds. See 735 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/2-1306 (2013).  
47 These states are Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, and Vermont. See CONN. R. APP. P. 
§ 61-11; ME. R. CIV. P. 62(e); MASS. R. CIV. P. 62(d); VT. R. CIV. P. 62(d). 
48 These states are Alaska, Delaware, Maryland, and New York. See ALASKA R. APP. P. 
204(d), 603(a); DEL. CT. C.P.R. 62(c); MD. RULES 8-423; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5519 (McKinney 1995). 
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2. Varieties of Appeal Bond Reform Statutes and  
Their Underlying Rationales 
The forty-one states with reform statutes have passed a variety of appeal 
bond caps. Some states have only capped the amount necessary to secure 
punitive damages,49 while others have capped the amount necessary to 
secure all damages.50 Some states allow appeal bond caps to protect all civil 
defendants,51 others have special appeal bond caps that apply to small 
businesses,52 and many other states cap appeal bonds only for MSA signato-
ries and their successors and affiliates.53 To protect judgment creditors, the 
states that do cap appeal bonds allow a bond up to the full judgment amount 
if a court finds that the judgment debtor is intentionally dissipating his 
assets to avoid paying the judgment.54 
The variety of appeal bond cap provisions is explained by the different 
rationales set forth to support them. As discussed above, an initial motivat-
ing factor for state legislatures was the need to protect the payment streams 
that states derived from the MSA.55 Nevertheless, there are many other 
arguments that support appeal bond caps. First and foremost, appeal bond 
caps protect the right of a defendant to appeal without immediately forcing 
that defendant into bankruptcy as a consequence.56 Since it is not uncom-
mon for excessive jury verdicts to eventually get overturned on appeal, a 
prohibitive supersedeas bond requirement allows some erroneous judgments 
 
49 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 13-202(2) (2010) (instituting a cap of $1 million). 
50 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-16-125 (West 2005) (instituting a cap of $25 million). 
51 See, e.g., id. (creating a cap for supersedeas bonds “[i]n any civil action brought under any 
legal theory”). 
52 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 607-26(1) (Supp. 2011) (providing a cap of $1 million).  
53 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4D-13(b) (West 2009) (capping supersedeas bond amounts 
“in civil litigation under any legal theory involving a signatory, a successor of a signatory, or any 
affiliate of a signatory to the [MSA]”). 
54 See, e.g., id. § 52:4D-13(c) (“[I]f an appellee proves by a preponderance of the evidence 
that an appellant is dissipating assets outside the ordinary course of business to avoid payment of a 
judgment, a court may [order the appellant] . . . to post a bond in an amount up to the total 
amount of the judgment.”).  
55 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
56 See Behrens & Crouse, supra note 38, at 184-85 (arguing for an appeal bond reform act 
“intended to ensure that a defendant can appeal a massive judgment without being put out of 
business”); Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1125 (“Appeal bond caps are necessary so that defendants 
don’t have to go bankrupt merely to pursue an appeal . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
see also Ariz. House of Representatives Comm. on Judiciary, House of Representatives Committee 
on Judiciary Minutes (Mar. 3, 2011), 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (2011) [hereinafter Meeting Minutes] 
(statement of Marcus Osborn, Manager of Government and Public Affairs, Arizona Manufactur-
ers Council and Arizona Chamber of Commerce), available at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/ 
50leg/1R/comm_min/House/030311%20JUD.PDF ( justifying an appeal bond cap on the basis that 
a business’s ability to perform should not be hindered by having to set aside resources to appeal).  
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to evade review by appellate courts.57 Second, by facilitating appellate 
review of potentially erroneous judgments, appeal bond caps help preserve 
the judicial system’s reputation for fairness and accuracy.58 Third, and 
crucial to the Erie analysis below, massive bonding requirements can create 
an unfair negotiating advantage for plaintiffs in settlement discussions.59 If 
a defendant knows or suspects that he will not be able to afford the appeal 
bond, a plaintiff could pressure the defendant into a settlement he would 
not otherwise have accepted.60 Fourth, appeal bond caps protect a defendant 
company’s constituents, including its employees and other creditors, from 
the risk of the defendant entering bankruptcy in order to appeal a trial court 
judgment.61 As evidenced by the range of appeal bond caps that states have 
employed, some arguments exert greater influence than others. 
Given the variety of rationales and appeal bond reform statutes adopted 
by the states, the question arises whether federal district courts sitting in 
diversity must abide by the directive of a state appeal bond cap when setting 
the amount of a supersedeas bond, or whether a district court can, in its 
discretion, set an amount above the state statutory cap.  
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE COURT’S ERIE DOCTRINE EVOLUTION 
In Hanna v. Plumer,62 the Supreme Court clarified that the “Erie doc-
trine”63 could be broken down into two distinct parts.64 First, when confronted 
 
57 See Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1125 (“If defendant’s appeal is precluded by inability to post 
an exorbitant appeal bond, an appellate court’s ability to correct error and formulate legal 
standards will be frustrated.”). 
58 See id. at 1146 (“[A]n appeal is . . . a basic component of our idea of a fair and accurate 
decisionmaking system.”). 
59 See id. at 1126 (arguing that requiring appeal bonds in the full value of the judgment gives 
the plaintiff unfair leverage in settlement negotiations); see also Meeting Minutes, supra note 56 
(statement of Sen. Al Melvin) (stating that the appeal bond reform legislation would encourage 
proper settlements); Behrens & Crouse, supra note 38, at 184 (“[T]o add insult to injury, the 
defendant will most likely be forced to settle on unfavorable terms and pay a premium because it 
has been placed over a barrel.”). As to the impact of a changed settlement landscape on the Erie 
analysis, at least one scholar has argued that a federal court cannot choose a rule that would alter 
the “expected value” of a claim in litigation. Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and Erie, 64 
VAND. L. REV. 877, 880-81 (2011). 
60 See, e.g., Harr, supra note 37, at 93-95 (discussing Raymond Loewen’s predicament in 
O’Keefe). 
61 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
62 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
63 In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, the Supreme Court had to decide whether state law or federal 
law determined the duty of care standard in a typical personal injury case arising out of a train 
accident. 304 U.S. 64, 629-70 (1938). In overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)—
which held that federal courts were “free to exercise an independent judgment as to what the 
common law of the State is—or should be,” Erie, 304 U.S. at 71 (citing Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 
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with a possible vertical choice-of-law issue, a federal court must ask whether 
the Constitution or Congress has already directed that federal law apply in 
the given scenario.65 Professor Freer has termed this analysis the “Hanna 
prong” of the Erie doctrine.66 If a constitutional provision,67 Federal Rule,68 
or federal statute69 controls the issue at hand, it will trump contrary state 
law unless the federal directive is invalid.70 For a Federal Rule to be valid, it 
must meet the requirements of the Rules Enabling Act (REA) and not 
“abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”71 Since the choice-of-law 
decision is clear if a court finds that there is a valid Federal Rule on point, 
the crucial analysis under the Hanna prong is whether the Federal Rule 
“controls the issue.”72 When there is no constitutional provision or congres-
sional directive on point, a court undertakes the second part of the analysis 
under the Erie doctrine, what Professor Freer has termed the “RDA 
prong.”73 However, this analysis leads a court down the murky and often 
 
18)—the Erie Court held that “[t]here is no federal general common law.” Id. at 78. Instead, the law 
of the state should be applied in suits brought in federal court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, 
unless the “matters [are] governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress.” Id. 
Ultimately, the Erie doctrine demands that when federal courts sitting in diversity are ruling on 
questions of substantive state law, they must apply the state’s substantive law, but are free to 
impose federal procedural law. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465. The Erie decision was largely motivated by 
the Court’s concern with the preferential treatment that out-of-state citizens could receive by 
choosing to bring their suits in federal court. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75. The two effects of this 
injustice—forum shopping and the inequitable administration of the laws—would later become 
known as the “twin aims of Erie.” See, e.g., Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. 
64 See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. 
REV. 1637, 1637 (1998). 
65 Id. (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471). 
66 Id. 
67 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws 
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (mandating that 
state law govern civil actions except where the “Constitution or treaties of the United States or 
Acts of Congress” provide otherwise). 
68 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471 (clarifying that there is no Erie analysis to be made “[w]hen a 
situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules”). 
69 See Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988) (“[A] district court sitting in diver-
sity must apply a federal statute that controls the issue before the court and that represents a valid 
exercise of Congress’ constitutional powers.”). 
70 Id.; Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. 
71 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). The Supreme Court has never found a Federal Rule to violate 
the REA. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Introduction: Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 63 VAND. L. 
REV. EN BANC 91, 101 (2010), http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/articles/2010/10/Burch-
Introduction-to-Dukes-Roundtable-77-Vand.-L.-Rev.-En-Banc-10-2010.pdf. 
72 Stewart, 487 U.S. at 27. 
73 Freer, supra note 64, at 1637 (deriving this name from the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1652). 
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unhelpful path of distinguishing between matters of “substance” and 
“procedure.”74 
A. The Evolution of the Court’s Hanna-Prong Analysis 
The Court has grappled with interpreting the Federal Rules for over 
sixty years.75 At times, the Court has construed the Federal Rules narrowly 
to avoid addressing a conflict with the REA or a contrary state law.76 In 
other cases, the Court has interpreted the Federal Rules broadly to find a 
conflict and have the Federal Rule govern.77 As an example of the former 
trend, in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,78 the Court 
purposefully sidestepped the REA when it had to interpret the language of 
FRCP 41(b).79 Despite Rule 41(b)’s directive that “any dismissal not under 
this rule” (as was the case in Semtek) “operates as an adjudication on the 
merits,”80 the Court decided that a judgment “on the merits” was not 
“necessarily a judgment entitled to claim-preclusive effect.”81 As commenta-
tors have pointed out, “the Court’s interpretation strain[ed] the Rule’s text 
and contravene[d] its history” in order to escape a conflict with the REA.82 
The Court similarly gave FRCP 3 a narrow construction in Walker v. Armco 
Steel Corp., holding that the plain meaning of the rule was that it “governs 
the date from which various timing requirements of the Federal Rules begin 
to run, but does not affect state statutes of limitations.”83 In so doing, the 
 
74 See id. 
75 See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 556-57 (1949) (construing the 
scope of Rule 23 to allow for the application of state law). 
76 See infra notes 78-84, 87-88 and accompanying text. 
77 See infra notes 85-86, Error! Bookmark not defined.-94 and accompanying text. 
78 531 U.S. 497 (2001). 
79 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1452 (2010) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring) (citing Semtek as a case where the Court avoided interpreting FRCP 41(b) in a 
way that would violate the REA’s jurisdictional limitation). 
80 FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). 
81 Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503. 
82 Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1150 (2002) (citing Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping, 
and Federal Common Law, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1039-47 (2002)). 
83 446 U.S. 740, 751 (1980). But see id. at 750 n.9 (“This is not to suggest that the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure are to be narrowly construed in order to avoid a ‘direct collision’ with 
state law. The Federal Rules should be given their plain meaning.”). Interestingly, seven years later, 
when the Court had another opportunity to consider Rule 3 in the context of a federal question 
case, the Court interpreted it as a tolling provision, to the exclusion of the timing requirements 
contained within the federal statute that served as the basis of the lawsuit. West v. Conrail, 481 
U.S. 35, 39-40 (1987). 
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Court avoided a conflict between Rule 3 and an Oklahoma state law regard-
ing statute of limitations.84  
In contrast, in Burlington Northern Railroad v. Woods, the Court gave 
FRAP 38 an expansive meaning, vesting broad discretion in federal judges 
to assess “just damages” when sanctioning a frivolous appeal.85 The Court 
determined that a conflicting state rule, which mandated a ten percent 
penalty when certain conditions were met, would have impermissibly 
limited this discretion and was therefore displaced by the Federal Rule.86 
Nearly a decade later in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., the Court, 
citing Walker, instructed that federal courts interpret the scope of the 
Federal Rules “with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory 
policies.”87 This ruling cast some doubt on the instruction the Court gave in 
Walker—to read the Federal Rules according to their plain meaning.88  
In the Court’s most recent pronouncement on demarcating the scope of 
the Federal Rules, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co., 
the majority interpreted FRCP 23 very broadly. 89 At issue was a New York 
state tort reform measure, Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) § 901(b), 
which prohibited class actions for certain types of claims.90 The Court 
rejected the argument that Rule 23 and § 901(b) could coexist if they were 
interpreted such that Rule 23 reached the issue of class “certifiability” while 
§ 901(b) addressed class “eligibility.”91 The Court instead guaranteed a 
conflict with state law, and as a valid procedural rule, Rule 23 controlled the 
issue in the case.92 Importantly, Justice Scalia, desiring a uniform applica-
tion of the Federal Rules, declared that a Federal Rule’s validity does not 
depend on the state interest involved.93 Rather, the validity of a Federal 
Rule under the REA is entirely dependent on whether it can reasonably be 
classified as procedural.94 While the Court has taken different approaches in 
 
84 Walker, 446 U.S. at 752. 
85 480 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1987). 
86 Id. at 3, 8. 
87 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996). 
88 See Freer, supra note 64, at 1643 (“[T]he Court . . . may have replaced the search for 
‘plain meaning’ with a heightened sensitivity to potential impact on state policy.”). 
89 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
90 Id. at 1436-37 (majority opinion). 
91 Id. at 1438. 
92 As noted above, the Court has never found a Federal Rule to violate the REA. See Burch, 
supra note 71, at 101. 
93 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444 (plurality opinion). 
94 Id. 
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interpreting the Federal Rules, when a particular rule is found to govern, 
the outcome is unavoidable: a federal court must apply it.95 
B. The Evolution of the Court’s RDA-Prong Analysis  
Conducting an analysis under the RDA prong, the Erie Court over-
turned Swift v. Tyson 96 —which had allowed federal courts exercising 
diversity jurisdiction to ignore “the unwritten law of the State as declared 
by its highest court”—and instead permitted the courts “to exercise an 
independent judgment as to what the common law of the State is—or 
should be.”97 In Erie, no constitutional or congressional directive addressed 
what duty of care a railroad company owed to pedestrians; as a result, the 
Court directed federal courts to apply a state’s substantive law when faced 
with state substantive law claims in diversity suits.98 This makes sense since 
the basic principles of federalism suggest that the Constitution does not 
give the federal courts authority to create substantive law.99 Consequently, 
state substantive law should apply, even in federal courts.100 In the decades 
following Erie, however, the Court’s approach to the RDA prong went 
through several iterations. 
1. Outcome-Determinative Approach 
First, in the two decades following Erie, the Court gravitated toward an 
“outcome-determinative” approach to the RDA prong, most famously 
exemplified in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.101 The Guaranty Trust Court 
interpreted Erie to mandate that “in all cases where a federal court [exercises 
diversity jurisdiction], the outcome of the litigation in the federal court 
should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome 
of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.”102 However, as the 
lower courts quickly realized, virtually every law, whether substantive or 
 
95 See id. at 1437 (majority opinion) (“The framework for our decision is familiar. We must 
first determine whether [the Federal Rule] answers the question in dispute. If it does, it gov-
erns . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
96 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
97 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71, 79-80 (1938). 
98 Id. at 78. 
99 See Freer, supra note 64, at 1645 (“The constitutional basis of Erie is the principle, inherent 
in federalism and embodied in the Tenth Amendment, of reserved powers. Because the federal 
courts have no enumerated authority under the Constitution to prescribe rules of substantive law 
in diversity cases, state law must govern.” (footnote omitted)). 
100 See id. 
101 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
102 Id. at 109. 
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procedural, could have an outcome-determinative effect. 103  Unless the 
federal courts sitting in diversity were to become clones of their state court 
counterparts, the outcome-determinative test alone could not reliably 
resolve the choice-of-law conflict. 
2. Federal–State Interest-Balancing Approach 
With its 1958 decision in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative,104 
the Court began to supplement the outcome-determinative test. Outcome 
determination alone would not be decisive; instead, the Court created a 
three-step analysis to determine whether state or federal law should ap-
ply.105 First, a federal court must ask whether state law determines the 
rights and obligations of the parties—whether the state law at issue is 
“bound up” with state rights and obligations.106 Second, if it is not clear that 
the state law at issue is substantive, federal courts should conduct an 
outcome-determinative test.107 However, even if applying federal law could, 
or would, lead to a different outcome, federal law should apply if there are 
“affirmative countervailing considerations” favoring the federal law. 108 
Third, if applying federal law would not be outcome-determinative, the 
Court suggested that federal courts balance the state interests involved with 
the countervailing interests of the federal judicial system.109 If a state’s 
interests are sufficiently strong, then absent a compelling federal policy 
reason to apply the federal law, a federal court should apply the state’s law.110  
 
103 See Freer, supra note 64, at 1647 (“To take an absurd example, a rule that pleadings be on a 
certain length of paper will determine the outcome if the plaintiff tries to file a complaint on 
nonconforming paper.”). Note that the Court in Erie, while very much concerned with litigant 
equality, did not pass judgment on the need for outcome equality. Id. at 1645-46. It was the 
Guaranty Trust Court that largely “converted the concern for litigant equality to a concern for 
outcome equality.” Id. 
104 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
105 See Freer, supra note 64, at 1647 (noting that while “there are other interpretations of Byrd, 
the most literal proceeds in three steps” (footnote omitted)). 
106 Byrd, 356 U.S. at 535. 
107 Id. at 536-37.  
108 Id. at 537-38. In Byrd, the important federal interest in the proper allocation of power 
between judge and jury was strong enough to apply the federal rule even if there was a chance that 
doing so would be outcome-determinative. Id. 
109 See Freer, supra note 64, at 1650; cf. 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER 
& EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4504, at 36-40 (2d ed. 
1996) (describing different formulations of the Byrd balancing test). 
110 Cf. Freer, supra note 64, at 1650. (“The federal courts can . . . be conscripted to help 
enforce a state policy, but not if doing so will harm the integrity of the federal judicial system.” 
(citing Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538)).  
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However, the Byrd test was plagued with its own ambiguities, such as 
deciphering which countervailing federal interests justified departing from a 
state rule.111 As a consequence, the Byrd test never quite took hold in the 
lower courts, and when the Supreme Court next addressed the Erie doctrine 
in Hanna v. Plumer, the Court barely mentioned its Byrd balancing test, 
leaving many to question whether the Byrd test remained a viable frame-
work for an Erie problem.112 
3. Modified Outcome-Determinative Approach 
In Hanna, the Court returned to the initial underpinnings of Erie, seek-
ing to prevent (1) vertical forum shopping (litigants choosing to sue in 
federal court rather than in state court) and (2) the inequitable administra-
tion of the laws (diverse parties obtaining more favorable outcomes in 
federal court than in state court).113 Therefore, under Hanna, the question is 
not simply whether the outcome would be different in federal court, but 
whether application of federal law would produce forum shopping or the 
inequitable administration of the laws.114 Importantly, the Court clarified 
that a state law would only apply if the inquiry were answered in the 
affirmative ex ante—that is, at the time when the plaintiff decides where to 
file suit.115 Setting aside the fact that the Court’s RDA analysis in Hanna 
was dictum, one of the more troubling questions arising out of Hanna was 
how this new test was to be applied in conjunction with the previous tests 
announced by the Court.116 Instead of repudiating one test and replacing it 
with another, the Court continued to create new approaches without 
advising how the different tests would work together. 
4. A Rebirth of Byrd?  
Although commentators still debate whether Byrd survived Hanna,117 the 
Court made clear in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc. that the Byrd 
 
111 See 19 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 109, § 4504, at 36. 
112 See id. at 48-49 (“The status of the Byrd case . . . is less certain.”); Freer, supra note 64, 
at 1653-54 (questioning the status of the Byrd test following Hanna).  
113 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965). 
114 Id. at 468 (“The outcome-determination test . . . cannot be read without reference to 
the twin aims of the Erie rule . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
115 Id. at 468-69. 
116 See Freer, supra note 64, at 1653-54 (raising the question “of how Byrd [was] to function 
with the twin aims test” given that the Hanna Court did not discuss or “purport to overrule” 
Byrd). 
117 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 987, 1001-02 (2011) (arguing that Byrd did survive Hanna). 
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balancing test was alive and well.118 Interestingly, the Court decided to 
revive Byrd in the context of its Hanna-prong analysis, not its RDA analy-
sis.119 Nonetheless, it became clear that the Byrd balancing test was still a 
valid interpretive tool, as balancing the state and federal interests at play is 
a helpful exercise when conducting an RDA analysis.  
In Gasperini, the Court dealt with a New York state law, CPLR 
§ 5501(c), that set forth a standard for appellate review of jury verdicts and 
gave appellate courts the power to order a remittitur when the award 
“deviat[ed] materially from what would be reasonable compensation.”120 
This case presented two distinctive Erie conflicts: (1) a conflict with the 
Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination Clause; and (2) a conflict with FRCP 
59(a).121 With regard to the Seventh Amendment conflict, the Court had to 
decide both the proper standard in the trial court for reviewing a motion to 
alter a jury verdict and the proper standard for appellate review of the trial 
court’s determination.122 Here, the Court, discussing the Byrd balancing test, 
decided it could accommodate the state and federal interests at play by 
having the trial court apply New York’s “deviates materially” standard while 
allowing a federal appellate court to review the trial court’s determination 
using an “abuse of discretion” standard.123 Additionally, by permitting a 
district court to order a new trial when a jury verdict “deviated materially” 
from what would be reasonable compensation, the Gasperini majority 
concluded that Rule 59(a) was not instructive on the standard to be used in 
evaluating jury awards, and consequently, on whether a new trial should be 
granted.124  
Had Rule 59(a) covered the issue, as Justice Scalia argued in dissent, 
Hanna clearly required that the Federal Rule govern. 125  The majority, 
acknowledging the difficulty in distinguishing between matters of substance 
and procedure, viewed the New York directive as a procedural mechanism 
 
118 See 518 U.S. 415, 431-32 (1996) (discussing and citing to Byrd). But see Stephen B. Bur-
bank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
1924, 1949 (2006) (arguing that the Court has not revived Byrd and pointing out that the Gasperini 
Court “ignored [Byrd] in dealing with the problem on which it might have made a difference and 
invoked [Byrd] on the problem for which it was redundant” (footnote omitted)). 
119 See Freer, supra note 64, at 1656 (observing that “the RDA discussion in Gasperini does not 
mention Byrd”). 
120 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 418. 
121 See id. at 426, 433.  
122 Id. at 433-35. 
123 Id. at 437-38. 
124 See id. at 433 (interpreting Rule 59(a) as saying simply that federal courts could grant a 
new trial after a jury trial on any ground recognized at common law). 
125 See id. at 467-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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with substantive goals.126 In this way, the majority interpreted Rule 59(a) 
“with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies” in 
order to avoid a conflict,127 thereby distancing the Court from Walker’s 
directive to interpret the Federal Rules in accordance with their plain 
meaning.128  
III. APPLYING THE ERIE DOCTRINE TO STATE APPEAL BOND 
REFORM STATUTES AND FEDERAL RULE OF  
CIVIL PROCEDURE 62(d) 
FRCP 62(d) allows a district court judge to stay execution of a judg-
ment while a judgment debtor’s appeal works its way through the appellate 
process. Because Rule 62(d) does not specify the amount a judgment debtor 
must post in order to secure a stay, the federal courts have read the Rule 
consistently with former Rule 73(d), which, while expressing a preference 
for a bond in the amount of the judgment plus costs and interest, allowed 
judges discretion to accept a lesser amount if the judgment debtor could 
show good cause.129 Any state statute that caps the amount of a supersedeas 
bond, if applied in federal court, would ostensibly take away the discretion 
federal judges have enjoyed in setting supersedeas bond amounts through-
out the federal judiciary’s existence.130 This Part applies the Court’s evolv-
ing Erie doctrine to the conflict between Rule 62(d) and state statutes 
capping appeal bonds. 
 A. Hanna-Prong Analysis of Rule 62(d) and State Appeal Bond  
Reform Provisions 
Is Rule 62(d) broad enough to cover the question of how much a de-
fendant must secure via supersedeas bond to stay enforcement proceedings 
 
126 Id. at 429. The majority classified CPLR § 5501(c) as substantive because the New York 
directive “was designed to provide an analogous control” to statutory caps on damages, which both 
parties agreed were substantive. Id. 
127 Id. at 427 n.7. 
128 See Freer, supra note 64, at 1642-43. 
129 See supra Section I.A (describing the historical underpinnings of the supersedeas bond 
and the current federal practice with regard to Rule 62(d)). 
130 See supra Section I.A. Local court rules across the country have filled in the gap created 
when the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure supplanted former Rule 73(d) and instruct judges 
as to the sufficiency of a supersedeas bond. See supra note 26 (providing examples of such local 
court rules). However, local rules are not afforded the same deference as the congressionally 
approved Federal Rules. See Ashland Chem. Inc. v. Barco Inc., 123 F.3d 261, 264 n.2 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(“[W]e decline to extend Hanna’s more lenient scrutiny of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to 
include [a] Local Rule.”). 
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in a case where a damages award (inclusive of compensatory and punitive 
damages) is in excess of a state’s statutory cap on appeal bonds? In light of 
the wave of appeal bond reform and the significant state interests motivat-
ing these reforms, it is possible to read Rule 62(d) as not covering the entire 
issue of supersedeas bond requirements, but instead leaving room for the 
application of state statutes.131 
1. State Appeal Bond Reform Statutes Do Not Affect  
Rule 62(d)’s Process Requirements 
The issue of setting supersedeas bond amounts can be distinguished 
from the cases holding that where state supersedeas bond statutes conflict 
with a specific command of Rule 62, the Rule governs. For example, when a 
state statute prescribes a certain mandatory process for filing a supersedeas 
bond that conflicts with the mandate of Rule 62(d), the Federal Rule 
governs. In Vacation Village, Inc. v. Clark County, a Nevada statute required 
that a state agency deposit with the court the full judgment amount before 
disputing a monetary judgment on appeal.132 The Ninth Circuit correctly 
held that this requirement directly conflicted with Rule 62(d)’s command 
that an appellant may secure a stay as a matter of right upon posting a 
satisfactory supersedeas bond.133 As a “purely procedural” rule addressing 
the process for obtaining a stay, Hanna undisputedly commands federal 
courts sitting in diversity to apply Rule 62(d) if it covers the situation.134 
Similarly, other courts, when confronted with state statutes that allow for 
public entities to obtain a stay on appeal without posting a supersedeas 
bond or other form of security, have routinely held that Rule 62(d) 
preempts these statutes.135 The rationale here is that federal courts must 
follow Rule 62(d)’s policy of requiring security, via supersedeas bond or 
 
131 There are, of course, limits to this interpretation. For example, a state statute capping the 
amount a defendant must secure by supersedeas bond at $1000, regardless of the amount of the 
judgment, would be untenable. Such a statute would violate the purpose behind Rule 62(d), which 
is “to preserve the status quo while protecting the non-appealing party’s rights pending appeal.” 
Poplar Grove Planting & Ref. Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d 1189, 1190-91 (5th Cir. 
1979). A state’s appeal bond reform statute cannot be allowed to make Rule 62(d) a meaningless 
formality. Rather, a state’s statute should only apply in federal court if it promotes an important 
substantive state interest and does not violate the purpose behind Rule 62(d). 
132 497 F.3d 902, 913 (9th Cir. 2007). 
133 Id. at 913-14. 
134 See id. (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465, 471-72 (1965), and Bass v. First Pac. 
Networks, Inc., 219 F.3d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
135 See Leuzinger v. County of Lake, 253 F.R.D. 469, 474-75 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (discussing 
several cases holding that, when Rule 62(d) conflicts with a state law, Rule 62(d) prevails). 
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otherwise, before a stay is granted.136 Again, however, the courts take issue 
with the fact that a state law is supplanting the process for obtaining a post-
judgment stay, not the adequacy of a bond posted pursuant to the proper 
federal process.137 
In contrast, state appeal bond caps do not supplant the process for secur-
ing a postjudgment stay. The appeal bond reform statutes comply with Rule 
62’s policy of disfavoring unsecured stays during the pendency of an 
appeal.138 Rule 62(d) appears, by its plain meaning, to only regulate the 
procedure for securing a postjudgment stay. However, whether the Rule is 
given a narrow or broad construction will determine whether Rule 62(d) in 
fact covers the scenario at issue. 
2. Appeal Bond Caps and Judicial Discretion 
Appeal bond caps do, however, restrict the discretion judges can exercise 
in setting supersedeas bond amounts pursuant to Rule 62(d). According to 
Burlington Northern Railroad v. Woods, when a Federal Rule provides for 
judicial discretion, a mandatory state rule that interferes with that discre-
tion will not be given effect in federal court.139 In Burlington Northern, the 
Court interpreted FRAP 38, which gives judges the discretion to award 
“just damages” to an appellee upon a determination that the appellant 
pursued a frivolous appeal. 140  Rule 38 allows judges to determine the 
amount of damages, if any, that should be awarded on a case-by-case basis, 
while the conflicting state rule mandated a ten percent penalty across the 
board when certain criteria were met.141 Reading Rule 38 broadly, the Court 
held the mandatory state provision inapplicable in federal courts because it 
would have the effect of requiring a federal court to assess specific damages, 
whereas the court may otherwise have assessed a lesser amount—or none at 
all.142 Similarly, in Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corp., the Court held that a 
state law disfavoring forum-selection clauses was not applicable in federal 
 
136 Id. at 475. 
137 See id. (holding that “Rule 62 provides the process for post-judgment stays,” thereby sup-
planting any state law that allows for a postjudgment stay to be granted without posting security). 
138 See Van Huss v. Landsberg, 262 F. Supp. 867, 870 (W.D. Mo. 1967) (“Rule 62 . . . indicates 
a policy against any unsecured stay of execution after the expiration of the time for filing a motion 
for new trial.”). 
139 480 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1987); see also Benjamin Grossberg, Comment, Uniformity, Federalism, and 
Tort Reform: The Erie Implications of Medical Malpractice Certificate of Merit Statutes, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 217, 242 (2010). 
140 480 U.S. at 7. 
141 Id. at 3-4. 
142 Id. at 7-8. 
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courts if it interfered with a district court’s exercise of discretion in con-
ducting a transfer-of-venue analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).143  
A federal court could follow the approach of these cases by broadly con-
struing FRCP 62(d) and concluding that the Rule covers the issue of setting 
the amount of a supersedeas bond. Under this construction, since state 
statutes capping supersedeas bonds would interfere with a Federal Rule’s 
“discretionary mode of operation,” these statutes should be inapplicable in 
the federal courts.144 
This approach, however, is not a foregone conclusion. The discretionary 
aspect of Rule 62(d) is distinguishable from the provisions in dispute in 
Burlington Northern and Stewart. In Burlington Northern, the Court worried 
that the mandatory operation of the Alabama penalty provision could force 
a federal court to assess damages for a nonfrivolous appeal, where FRAP 38 
would not have directed a judge to do so.145 Likewise, in Stewart, the 
application of the Alabama statute, which discouraged the application of 
forum-selection clauses “providing for out-of-state venues,”146 would have 
altered the analysis § 1404(a) demanded.147 Conversely, FRCP 62(d) does 
not allow judges discretion to stay execution of the judgment upon the 
posting of a supersedeas bond; the stay is automatic once a court approves 
the bond.148 The discretion the court retains is whether to approve the bond 
or not.149 Thus, state appeal bond cap statutes would not be forcing judges 
to grant stays where they otherwise would not have done so; such statutes 
would only fill in the details as to the sufficiency of a supersedeas bond.  
 
143 487 U.S. 22, 30-31 (1988). The federal law here allows district courts, in their discretion, to 
transfer any civil action to another district in the country. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006); Stewart, 487 
U.S. at 29. The state law in question, in categorically disfavoring forum-selection clauses, would 
have impermissibly instructed a district court to give more weight to one factor—the presence of a 
forum-selection clause—than other factors in its transfer analysis. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30-31.  
144 See Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 7. If Rule 62(d) were broad enough to control the 
issue, it would govern absent some contention that the Rule violated the Constitution or the REA. 
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). 
145 See 480 U.S. at 8 (“Federal Rule 38 adopts a case-by-case approach to identifying and 
deterring frivolous appeals; the Alabama statute precludes any exercise of discretion within its 
scope of operation.”). 
146 487 U.S. at 30. 
147 See id. at 31 (“Congress has directed that multiple considerations govern transfer within 
the federal court system, and a state policy focusing on a single concern or a subset of the factors 
identified in § 1404(a) would defeat that command.”). 
148 Rule 62(d) states that “the appellant may obtain a stay by supersedeas bond.” FED. R. 
CIV. P. 62(d). It does not state that the court may grant a stay if an appellant posts a supersedeas 
bond. 
149 See id. (“The stay takes effect when the court approves the bond.”). 
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Rule 62(d)’s statutory predecessor, 28 U.S.C. § 874,150 directed an appel-
lant to “giv[e] the security required by law” in order to stay a judgment 
upon appeal.151 The substance of § 874 was incorporated into Rule 62(d) 
and former Rule 73(d).152 However, when the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure supplanted former Rule 73(d) without incorporating its substance 
as to the sufficiency of a supersedeas bond, the Federal Rules lacked any 
explicit direction as to what security was “required by law.”153 Consequently, 
federal courts have largely continued to read Rule 62(d) in light of former 
Rule 73(d).154 Federal supersedeas practice, both past and present, clearly 
evinces a policy to require an appellant to provide security on appeal. 
However, existing federal practice also takes into consideration circum-
stances when a supersedeas bond in the full amount of a judgment would 
not be required.155 Therefore, rather than supplanting judicial discretion, 
one can view appeal bond caps as working in tandem with established 
federal policy, helping to inform the district courts as to the sufficiency of a 
supersedeas bond. 
3. The Case for Accommodation 
A court can simply give Rule 62(d) a narrower construction by utilizing 
the interpretive principles the Court described in Gasperini v. Center for 
Humanities, Inc. to avoid a conflict with state law. Gasperini instructed courts 
to interpret the Federal Rules “with sensitivity to important state interests 
 
150 Section 874 was repealed by the 1948 Judicial Code. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 
869 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.); see also Hudson City Sav. Bank v. Hampton Gardens 
Ltd., 438 A.2d 323, 326 n.3 (N.J. 1981).  
151 28 U.S.C. § 874 (1934) (repealed 1948). 
152 Table Showing Disposition of All Sections of Former Title 28, 28 U.S.C. intro. (2006); see 
also C.H. Sanders Co. v. BHAP Hous. Dev. Fund Co., 750 F. Supp. 67, 72-73 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). 
153 28 U.S.C. § 874. 
154 See, e.g., Strong v. Laubach, 443 F.3d 1297, 1299 (10th Cir. 2006) (interpreting Rule 62(d) 
as usually requiring a bond for the full amount of the judgment, unless the district court decides to 
set a different amount); Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1154-55 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d on 
other grounds, 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (same); Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm. Ass’n, 636 
F.2d 755, 758-59 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (same); Poplar Grove Planting & Ref. Co. v. Bache Halsey 
Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d 1189, 1191 (5th Cir. 1979) (same). 
155 See Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 786 F.2d 794, 796 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(setting forth two situations in which accepting alternative security might be appropriate: “where 
the defendant’s ability to pay the judgment is so plain that the cost of the bond would be a waste 
of money”; and “where the requirement would put the defendant’s other creditors in undue 
jeopardy”); Fed. Prescription Serv., 636 F.2d at 757-58 (agreeing with the view that Rule 62(d) “does 
not prohibit the district court from exercising a sound discretion to authorize unsecured stays in 
cases it considers appropriate” and citing cases where courts have found it appropriate to depart 
from the norm of requiring a bond in the full amount of the judgment). 
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and regulatory policies.”156 States have passed statutes capping appeal bonds 
with several important objectives in mind, including preserving the right to 
appeal massive monetary judgments without forcing a judgment debtor into 
bankruptcy, ensuring appellate review of erroneous judgments, protecting 
payment streams from signatories to the MSA, and preventing plaintiffs 
from obtaining an undue advantage in settlement negotiations.157 Mean-
while, the countervailing federal interests appear to include preserving the 
discretion of district court judges in setting the amount of a supersedeas 
bond and the uniform application of Rule 62(d) in federal courts across the 
country. Rule 62(d), however, does not call into question an “essential 
characteristic” of the federal judiciary system, such as the allocation of 
power between judge and jury.158 
In an effort to accommodate a state’s interest in capping an appeal bond, 
a court can construe Rule 62(d) simply to control the process of obtaining a 
postjudgment stay in federal courts, while allowing state law to fill in the 
substance of what constitutes a sufficient supersedeas bond. The Seventh 
Circuit grappled with this type of Gasperini analysis in Houben v. Telular 
Corp., where it had to decide whether Rule 62(b) or state law governed an 
employer’s liability with regard to the timely satisfaction of a judgment.159 
At issue was a state law mandating that statutory penalties begin to accrue 
fifteen days after a court orders an employer to pay wages due to an em-
ployee. 160  Before the fifteen days expired in this case, the employer-
defendant had filed a post-trial motion, implicating Rule 62(b), which 
grants federal judges discretion to stay execution of the judgment.161 On the 
other hand, the state provision operated in a mandatory fashion, requiring 
 
156 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996). 
157 See Behrens & Crouse, supra note 38, at 183-84; Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1112, 1124-26, 
1145; see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-12-103 (2013) (instituting an appeal bond cap “in order to 
ensure that financial considerations do not adversely impact the right of appeal”); Meeting 
Minutes, supra note 56 (statement of Marcus Osborn, Manager of Government and Public Affairs, 
Arizona Manufacturers Council and Arizona Chamber of Commerce) (emphasizing that the 
choice to appeal should not negatively affect a business’s ability to function). 
158 See, e.g., Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431-33 (discussing the Second Circuit’s failure to “attend to 
‘[a]n essential characteristic of [the federal court] system’”—i.e., the division of power between 
judge and jury—“when it used [a state rule] as ‘the standard for [federal] appellate review’” (first, 
second, and fourth alterations in original) (citations omitted)); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. 
Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537-39 (1958) (noting the “strong federal policy against allowing state rules to 
disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts”). 
159 309 F.3d 1028, 1030, 1038 (7th Cir. 2002). 
160 Id. at 1030. 
161 Id. at 1029, 1038. 
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penalties to accrue fifteen days after a court order, regardless of any post-
trial motions.162  
In Houben, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that Gasperini provided a 
way for the federal courts to implement “the substantive elements of [a] 
state statute within the framework of federal procedures.”163 The court 
hypothesized that it could accommodate both the state statute and Rule 62 
by adhering to Rule 62’s timing directives and requiring federal judges to 
exercise their Rule 62(b) discretion “in favor of permitting immediate 
execution” of a judgment to give effect to the state law.164 However, the 
court found this accommodation to be “too much of a strain” because it 
would rob federal judges of their discretion to institute a stay under Rule 
62(b).165 Instead, the court fell back on the familiar dictates of Hanna and 
applied the valid Federal Rule to the exclusion of the conflicting state 
provision.166  
Importantly, the Rule 62(b) conflict described in Houben is distinguisha-
ble from a Rule 62(d) conflict with statutes that cap appeal bonds. First, the 
Rule 62(b) conflict dealt with a quintessentially procedural aspect of the 
Federal Rules—timing, which is something that appeal bond reform statutes 
do not interfere with. Second, Rule 62(b) explicitly vests federal judges 
with the discretion to issue a stay when it provides that “the court may 
stay . . . execution” upon the filing of a postjudgment motion.167 In con-
trast, the stay by supersedeas bond in Rule 62(d) is automatic when the 
court approves the bond.168 
By interpreting Rule 62(d) to reach only the process for obtaining a stay 
by supersedeas bond, and by acknowledging that the judicial discretion 
contained in Rule 62(d) is distinct from that afforded by other Federal Rules 
where courts have refused to seek an accommodation between the state and 
federal laws, courts can accommodate states’ interests in passing appeal bond 
reform statutes by applying the state statutes in conjunction with Rule 62(d). 
 
162 Id. at 1030-31, 1038. 
163 Id. at 1034-35. 
164 Id. at 1038. 
165 Id. at 1038-39. 
166 Id. at 1040. 
167 FED. R. CIV. P. 62(b). 
168 FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d); see also supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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B. RDA-Prong Analysis of Rule 62(d) and State Appeal Bond  
Reform Provisions 
If Rule 62(d) does not entirely cover the question of supersedeas bond 
amounts in cases with massive damages awards, one must dive into “the 
typical, relatively unguided Erie choice” to determine whether Rule 62(d) or 
a given state statute capping appeal bonds will apply.169 At this point, courts 
often point out that federal courts sitting in diversity should “apply state 
substantive law and federal procedural law.”170 However, this analysis has 
become so muddled that even the Supreme Court has called it a “challeng-
ing endeavor.”171 Therefore, given the impracticality of applying the distinc-
tion, instead of attempting to classify appeal bond reform statutes as 
“procedural” or “substantive,” this Comment addresses the underlying state 
and federal interests at play.172  
1. Outcome-Determinative Test 
The first step in any RDA-prong analysis is to conduct Guaranty Trust’s 
outcome-determinative test, as modified by Hanna, with an eye to the twin 
aims of Erie. Whether the application of a federal practice will produce 
vertical forum shopping must be determined from an ex ante perspective—
when the plaintiff is considering where to file his lawsuit.173 If federal courts 
sitting in diversity do not apply the state statutes that cap appeal bonds, the 
risk of vertical forum shopping will increase.  
For example, several states cap the amount a defendant must pay to ob-
tain a stay via supersedeas bond in certain circumstances to a set percentage 
of the defendant’s net worth.174 As a result, an astute plaintiff, hoping to win 
 
169 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). 
170 See, e.g., id. at 465. 
171 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). 
172 Cf. Joseph P. Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove: Further Reflections on the Erie Doctrine 
from a Conflicts Perspective, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 939, 972-75 (2011) (discussing the futility of 
the substance versus procedure distinction in the context of the Hanna prong of the Erie analysis). 
173 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468-69 (discussing how the Erie doctrine concerns itself only with 
differences between state and federal law that influence where a litigant chooses to bring suit). Of 
course, one must also pay attention to the ability of a defendant to remove a case to federal court. 
However, for the purposes of this analysis, where it is the plaintiff attempting to evade the state 
appeal bond cap, this Comment focuses on the plaintiff ’s initial choice of forum as implicating 
Hanna’s directive to avoid vertical forum shopping. 
174 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.733 (West 2000) (capping the amount a defendant in a 
certified class action must post to stay execution of a judgment at ten percent of the defendant’s 
net worth); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1916 (2008) (capping the amount of a supersedeas bond in any 
civil action at fifty percent of the defendant’s net worth); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
§ 52.006 (West 2003) (same); MISS. R. APP. P. 8 (capping the amount of a supersedeas bond, as 
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a judgment in excess of the state’s statutory cap, will be incentivized to sue 
in federal court rather than state court. The plaintiff will realize that, if 
nothing else, suing in federal court will provide a significant bargaining 
advantage in settlement negotiations. If a defendant thinks he will not be 
able to afford an appeal bond or will face significant financial hardship in 
doing so, he may be pressured into settling regardless of the merits of his 
arguments on appeal.175 Similar results will follow from statutory caps that 
provide a strict monetary limit as opposed to a percentage-of-net-worth 
limit.176 
However, the conclusion that the application of current federal practice 
would produce vertical forum shopping must be qualified. Even if vertical 
forum shopping were to occur, it would not result from the federal courts 
providing a different outcome per se. Rather, it would result from a plain-
tiff ’s educated decision that he could obtain a more favorable settlement in 
federal court than in a state court that would apply the state statute capping 
appeal bonds. The “expected value” of the plaintiff ’s claim would be al-
tered.177 Further, it would be very difficult to judge from the outset when 
application of Rule 62(d), as opposed to a state appeal bond reform statute, 
would lead to an “inequitable administration of the laws” by significantly 
altering the ultimate resolution of the case. 
It is likely that if the analysis were to end here, a court would determine 
vertical forum shopping would not occur because of the countervailing 
pressures that could still motivate a plaintiff to sue in state court, such as a 
more advantageous jury pool or an increased likelihood of obtaining a 
significant punitive damages award. A pure Hanna style outcome-
determination test would therefore lead most courts to follow current 
federal practice to the exclusion of state appeal bond reform statutes. 
However, if a federal court accepts the argument that the possibility of a 
 
to the punitive damages portion of a money judgment, at ten percent of the defendant’s net 
worth). 
175 See Behrens & Crouse, supra note 38, at 184 (asserting that “[i]ronically, the more egre-
gious the errors at trial, and the more outrageous the award, the more likely it is that the 
defendant will be unable to post a [sufficient] bond” and will be forced to settle); Harr, supra note 
37, at 93-95 (chronicling the settlement negotiations between O’Keefe and Loewen, and suggesting 
the role that the mandatory appeal bond played in the settlement); Rendleman, supra note 1, at 
1129 (explaining how the settlement in O’Keefe foreclosed appellate reversal of the “unfair jury 
verdict”). 
176 The statutes that do cap the amount of an appeal bond in relation to a defendant’s net 
worth typically also include a hard monetary cap and instruct courts to apply the lesser of the two. 
See supra note 174 (listing examples of such statutes). 
177 See Tidmarsh, supra note 59, at 880-81 (discussing how litigation strategies are influenced 
by the expected value of a claim—that is, the “product of the probability of recovery and the 
amount of the remedy if liability is found”). 
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claim’s “expected value” being significantly altered is sufficiently “outcome-
determinative,” a balancing test weighing the various state and federal 
interests should lead federal courts to apply the state appeal bond reform 
statutes. 
2. Byrd Balancing of State and Federal Interests 
Interestingly, when the Court conducted its RDA analysis in Gasperini, 
it limited itself to Hanna’s modified outcome-determinative test and did not 
invoke or apply the Byrd balancing test.178 However, a comparative analysis 
of different federal and state interests is useful in determining whether state 
law or federal practice should govern.179 Under Byrd, when the substance–
procedure distinction does not yield a clear answer, one moves on to an 
outcome-determination analysis informed by the question of whether 
enforcing the state’s law will further important state policies or whether 
there are strong countervailing federal interests at play favoring the applica-
tion of the federal law or rule.180  
There is no doubt that both Rule 62(d) and appeal bond reform statutes 
are procedural in nature.181 However, this does not mean that statutes 
capping appeal bonds do not further substantive state policies.182 Statutes 
instituting appeal bond caps implicate a defendant’s critical rights. States 
that have enacted these statutes—particularly statutes applying to all civil 
defendants and not just to MSA signatories—have made a firm choice to 
preserve an attainable avenue of appeal for certain defendants by staying 
execution of the trial court judgment without forcing those defendants into 
bankruptcy or an otherwise precarious financial position simply to obtain a 
supersedeas bond. And while the statutes are designed in part to ensure the 
accuracy of judicial judgments, they also seek to influence conduct outside 
 
178 See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 422-25, 431-33 (1996); Freer, supra 
note 64, at 1656. 
179 Cf. John A. Lynch, Jr., Federal Procedure and Erie: Saving State Litigation Reform Through 
Comparative Impairment, 30 WHITTIER L. REV. 283, 321-26 (2008) (advocating for federal courts 
to use comparative impairment analysis when conducting a vertical choice-of-law analysis). 
180 See Freer, supra note 64, at 1648-49. 
181 See Rendleman, supra note 1, at 1122, 1158-59, 1165 (referring to appeal bond reform stat-
utes as procedural); see also Bass v. First Pac. Networks, Inc., 219 F.3d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“Rule 62(d) is a purely procedural mechanism . . . .”). 
182 See, e.g., Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 429 (finding that while the New York state statute “con-
tain[ed] a procedural instruction, . . . the State’s objective [wa]s manifestly substantive” (citation 
omitted)); S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 310 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(explaining that some state rules, “though undeniably ‘procedural’ in the ordinary sense of the 
term,” must be treated as substantive by federal courts when “the state’s intention to influence 
substantive outcomes is manifest”). 
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the courtroom by leveling the playing field for settlement negotiations—a 
quintessentially substantive goal.183 A statute’s effect of altering the settle-
ment landscape after a judgment, but before an appeal, can be analogized to 
state statutes capping the amount of damages for a given cause of action. 
Since there is agreement in the statutory damages cap context that “Erie 
precludes a recovery in federal court significantly larger than the recovery 
that would have been tolerated in state court,”184 it is plausible to make the 
policy argument that courts should treat appeal bond statutes similarly. 
Enforcing appeal bond reform statutes in federal court would ensure 
that defendants maintain the rights that states bestowed on them by statute. 
Byrd cautions that even if applying state law would further important state 
goals, federal law should nonetheless apply if the integrity of the federal 
judicial system is at stake. However, unlike in Byrd, where the balance of 
power between judge and jury was in question, there is no similar issue 
affecting the integrity of the federal judicial system in the context of Rule 
62(d) and appeal bond reform statutes. Therefore, under a Byrd-style 
analysis, not only is there a risk of vertical forum shopping, but federal 
courts also have the ability to further state interests without damaging the 
integrity of the federal judicial system. Under such a scenario, federal courts 
should apply state statutes capping appeal bonds when applying current 
federal practice would be outcome-determinative.185  
CONCLUSION 
The federal courts need to preserve a uniformity of process throughout 
the federal court system. Requiring a defendant to obtain a postjudgment 
stay according to different processes in different districts would present a 
 
183 See Meeting Minutes, supra note 56 (statements of Sen. Al Melvin and Marcus Osborn, 
Manager of Government and Public Affairs, Arizona Manufacturers Council and Arizona 
Chamber of Commerce) (supporting the addition of appeal bond caps for substantive as well as 
procedural reasons); cf. S.A. Healy Co., 60 F.3d at 311 (arguing that settlement practice, much like 
damages, can be classified as “substantive” when vertical forum shopping is taken into considera-
tion); Jones v. Krautheim, 208 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1175, 1180 (D. Colo. 2002) (applying a Colorado 
state law concerning pleading requirements for punitive damages because one of the law’s 
purposes was to reduce the number of preemptive settlements). 
184 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431. 
185 Professor Burbank suggests that the Byrd balancing test does not balance state and federal 
interests, but rather balances the federal interest in following federal procedural practice with the 
federal interest in vertical uniformity between state and federal courts. Burbank, supra note 118, at 
1949 & n.162. Even if Professor Burbank is correct, courts should still apply state statutes capping 
appeal bonds. The statutes do not affect federal procedural practice, as they do not alter any 
procedure. Further, the federal courts have an interest in not becoming the “go-to” forum for every 
lawsuit with a potentially massive jury award. 
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significant threat to the integrity of the federal judicial system. Further, 
stripping a federal judge of discretion to grant a postjudgment stay, when 
the Federal Rules explicitly give discretion to the judge, is not appropriate. 
State statutes capping appeal bonds produce neither of these consequences. 
Rather, they complement existing judicial practice in the federal courts by 
lowering supersedeas bond amounts—provided the judgment creditor is still 
secured in some degree—where obtaining a bond in the full amount of a 
massive judgment is either unwise, impracticable, or unfair to the defend-
ant. Adhering to statutes capping appeal bonds would therefore not signifi-
cantly alter the current practice of federal judges; it would merely allow 
certain defendants to appeal in federal court adverse judgments that they 
already would have had the opportunity to appeal in state court. 
